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In his address to the European Parliament on 8 May 1985 
commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the ending of the 
Second World War, President Reagan said: 
"I am here to tell you today that America remains, as she was 40 
years ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see 
a strong unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger 
partner. Indeed John F Kennedy • • • explicitly made this 
objective a key tenet of post war American policy. That policy 
saw the New World and the Old as twin pillars of a larger 
democratic Community. We Americans still see European unity as a 
vital force in that historic process." 
This statement, predictably, was greeted with prolonged applause, 
but many of us felt even then that there was a certain uneasiness 
behind the euphoria and that by constantly reminding ourselves of 
the traditional closeness of our links we conveniently disguised 
the rising tide of questions and uncertainties that made our 
vaunted ties seem increasingly fragile. The relationship between 
America and her European allies has never been an easy one and it 
is only· by recognising our differences and working to resolve 
them in a constructive way that we can sustain the dynamic of our 
friendship and preserve our own freedoms while offering hope to 
the rest of the world. It is my task today to push this process 
forward by looking frankly at some of our problems and suggest 
some areas in which we need to work more closely together. 
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The European Community and 1992 
Americans tend to talk of Europe as if it was a homogeneous 
whole, but this is far from the truth. The Parliament in which I 
sit works in nine official languages, includes representatives of 
over sixty political parties arranged in eight broad groupings 
and represents twelve quite different political traditions 
ranging from long established democracies such as Great Britain 
and France to countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece where 
democratic Governments have been reinstated only recently. The 
index of gross domestic product per head ( in purchasing power 
parities) ranges from 14. 5 in Denmark and Germany to 6. 6 in 
Portugal and 7.0 in Greece. Given these disparities in political 
tradition and economic performance, the attempt to integrate 
these twelve separate countries into a single economic unit by 
the end of 1992 might seem hopelessly ambitious, yet this is the 
course on which the European Community is embarked, an ambitious 
programme of over 300 legislative measures designed to remove all 
obstacles to the free flow of people, goods and services. As we 
approach the half way stage, approximately one quarter of these 
have been carried through, notable progress has been made in the 
areas of common industrial and technical standards, liberalising 
capital markets and creating a single market for insurance and 
other financial services. It is quite true that major obstacles 
remain to be overcome: chief among these is the Commission's 
proposal to reduce indirect taxes throughout the Community to two 
distinct bands, each of them spread over 5 percentage points, a 
measure which they regard as essential if frontier controls are 
to be removed. This has run into predictable opposition from the 
different national governments, who regard the power to set their 
own tax rates as the bastion of national independence. Much hard 
bargaining remains to be done, but the signs are hopeful that 
this year of 1988 will be the year in which, as Commission 
"President 3acques Delors has predicted, the momentum to achieve 
the single market will become irreversible. 
At a meeting of the European Heads of Government in Brussels on 
12 February, significant agreements were reached on the reform of 
the Commun! ty finances including legally-binding restraints on 
the growth of agricultural production. These agreemen~s required 
considerable concessions from the national leaders, who, when it 
came to the pinch, were prepared to subordinate their short-term 
political interests to the overriding goal of achieving European 
integration. As a result, a major obstacle has been removed from 
the path of the 1992 programme and the Heads of Government.have 
demonstrated conclusively that they have the political will to 
achieve their common objective. 
The February Summit leaves me confident that the remaining 






US Business and the Single Market 
The single integrated European Market offers great opportunities 
for US business. Many major US corporations already have 
subsidiary operations in Europe and they will benefit, as will 
our domestic firms, from increased flexibility of operations and 
economies of scale. The days when it was necessary to have 
separate subsidiary companies to service different national 
markets will be gone and it will become practical and profitable 
to organise sales and production on a Continental scale. 
Opportunities will also accrue for stateside companies who wish 
to increase their business with Europe: they will only have to 
deal with one set of paperwork, one insurer, one transit agent 
and, hopefully before the end of the nineties, one single 
currency. The single European market will be good for US 
business and good for profits. 
As always, opportunities give rise to certain risks. There are 
those who see the single market as a convenient way of increasing 
protection against third country imports under the guise of 
favouring the development of European business. If increased 
protection were to be the consequence of the single market, many 
of the attractions of an integrated economy would be lost: lack 
of competitive stimulus and contracting trade flows would prevent 
us from achieving the promised growth. American business can 
play a crucial role in turning back this threat - by involving 
itself as closely as possible in the development of standards and 
the detailed framing of legislation so as to ensure that the 
rules are suitable for non-EC companies who wish to trade in 
Europe, and by resisting the siren calls for protectionist 
measures in the US itself, which if enacted would provide the 
perfect excuse for those who wish to make the single market an 
excuse for featherbedding as opposed to an opportunity for 
vrowth. During "1:hese next ~.itical -inonths, .I ·:believe .a ~eed 
closer contact between businessmen in Europe and America, many of 
whom have substantial investments in each other's markets, so 
that together they can make sure that the single market works for 





Transatlantic Trade disputes 
Unity of purpose and understanding between businessmen has become 
all the more necessary because of the series of niggling trade 
disputes which have poisoned relations between two major trading 
partners. The growing complexity of business economics and the 
desire of the media for rapid and easily-understood solutions has 
made life easy for the special pleaders of sectoral interests. 
Adjustment is a painful and occasionally demeaning business, 
demanding the frank admission of past mistakes. How much easier 
to wrap self-interest in spurious patriotism and point to the 
nefarious practices of foreigners as the reason for one's lack of 
commercial success. Self-indulgent calls for 'level playing 
fields' and 'fair' treatment conveniently disguise the fact that 
the current US trade deficit has its roots in the policies 
adopted by successive Administrations and not in the unfair 
trading practices elsewhere. 
In recent years, the European Community has made substantial 
concessions on steel, citrus, pasta, maize imports into Spain 
following enlargement, and telecommunications. As each dispute 
is settled, another raises it head: at present the most serious 
dispute is over the European aeroplane manufacturer, Airbus. US 
manufacturers who control nearly 80% of the world airframe market 
are seeking to exclude Airbus from the domestic US market on the 
grounds that it is subsidised by European Governments. They 
conveniently forget that the American industry receives 
substantial subventions from the US Government in the form of 
Government-financed research and development and cost-plus 
defence contracts. More to the point, if there were such things 
as international anti-trust rules the dominant position enjoyed 
by US aerospace industry would have been broken up long ago; as 
things are, it would be quite impossible £or £uropeans to gain 
even a toehold in this leading-edge high techno1ogy market 
without substantial help from the Governments who are share 
holders in Airbus industries. From the other side of the 
Atlantic, the actions of the American manufacturers look 
suspiciously like an attempt to use Section 301 to consolidate a 
degree of market exclusivity that is inconsistent with world 
trade growth and distinctly inimical to the interests of the 
American consumer. 
It has been profoundly depressing to witness the gradual slide 
from the free market principles of GATT towards bilateral 
agreements and unilateral counter measures; it is ironic to note 
that just as American exports are surging by monthly rates of up 
to 10%, a leading contender for the Presidency is finding it 
possible to attract substantial support for an overtly 
protectionist platform. The lesson of the thirties is clear: for 
each job saved by protection, hundreds are lost, and as the 
t . 
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negotiators meet in Geneva to reconstruct the open trading system 
and extend its provisions to services, intellectual property, and 
agriculture, we look to the United States to provide the 
leadership and moral authority that we have a right to expect 
from the world's leading economic power. 
I • 
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Agriculture and Trade 
The bitterest and most damaging of our trade disputes are those 
concerned with agriculture. This is not surprising because not 
only do agriculture and the rural areas occupy a special place in 
a nation's sense of identity, it is also the industry which has 
been most affected by technological change. Early in the 1970's 
we were all pre-occupied with the problems of feeding the World's 
expanding population from our finite food production resources; 
now less than twenty years later, we are struggling to come to 
terms with chronic overproduction. 
Within the European Community we have been engaged in reforming 
the Common Agricultural Policy since the early eighties. The 
process has proved exceptionally difficult, because none of us 
are prepared to see our agricultural industries devastated and 
our countryside made derelict. Farmers have to be led away from 
a system which is entirely oriented to increasing production to 
one that concentrates on quality, cost efficiency and, where 
necessary, income rather than price supports. Progress has been 
slow but steady: in 1984 quotas were established for the dairy 
sector, and in 1986 further restraints were introduced and 
limitations placed on beef support systems. In February this 
year the European Council at long last reached agreement on 
stabilising cereal production at 160 million tons and oil seed 
rape at 4. 5 million tons. Further measures will certainly be 
necessary particularly in the cereals sector, but we can say with 
confidence that the principles of reform have now been firmly 
established and the re-adjustment of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, like the programme to achieve the single market, is 
irreversible. 
American farmers have suffered severely as their traditional 
customers came closer to self-sufficiency and world-
Dverproduction forced .down prices. Successive Administrations 
have done their best to ease the pain of adjustment with price 
supports, loan guarantees and subsidised overseas sales. During 
this period the US share of world markets has fallen from 49% in 
1981/82 to 29% in 1985/86 and during the same period the value 
has dropped from $48 billion in 1981 to $26 billion in 1986. 
Over the same period EC market share has remained steady at 14%, 
and, last year, our trade deficit with the US in agricultural 
products was $2.6 billion. It is misleading and unfair to blame 
the Common Agricultural Policy for the problems of the US 
farmers. What we need is mutual recognition of a common problem 
and joint action to put it right. 
The GATT negotiations are the proper forum in which to achieve 
this and we were intrigued by the US proposals to eliminate all 
price supports and export subsidies within ten years. Our own 
difficulties with agricultural reform have made us sceptical 
about the extent to which this is a realistic objective, but the 
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desire drastically to reduce subsidies is mutual and working 
together closely on the detailed implementation of such a 
programme may well bring an accord regarding this ultimate goal. 
If order and sense are to be brought into agricultural trade, we 
must put rhetoric behind us, abandon the notion that any one 
nation has a God-given right to dominate agricultural markets and 
get on with the urgent job of detailed reform, recognising that 
all change involves difficult and painful decisions for everyone. 
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The Global Economy 
Even if we have learned nothing else from the events of the past 
few years, at least we now recognise that the days when national 
states, however powerful, could be economically independent have 
long gone. Indeed, the realisation that economic nationalism led 
to disaster was one of the key insights which led the states of 
Europe to seek full economic integration. The 19 October crash 
produced immediate reactions in London, Tokyo, Frankfurt and 
Paris and the fall in the US stockmarket was caused in part by a 
perception that the US was out of tune with her partners in 
resolving the allied problems of excess! ve budgetary and trade 
deficits. It is simply not possible to run an economic policy 
without considering the likely effects on trading partners or 
indeed the way in which their decisions have an impact on 
domestic policies. We need to give more attentio:n to the 
international framework necessary for a global economy to work 
and agree between ourselves on the degree of regulation necessary 
for it to work effectively. It seems self-evident that any 
system of world economic co-operation must be based on agreement 
and understanding between the United States and the European 
Community. This could then be developed to encompass Japan and 
the other fast-developing countries of the Pacific Rim on the 
basis of mutual understanding and mutual advantage. By 
implementing the 1992 programme the EC is already making a 
contribution to this process, not only by providing a test bed, 
but also, at the end of the process, providing America with a 
strong and influential partner even, perhaps, with its own common 
currency capable of taking some of the strain off the dollar. 
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The Defence of the West post INF 
I can well recall the then Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, Laurence Eagleburger, telling a group of 
Parliamentarians in 1982 that we should be careful that we did 
not let everyday niggling trade disputes poison the atmosphere 
and dog the channels of our dialogue to such an extent that when, 
towards the end of the decade, we were faced with really serious 
questions of defence and security we would find that our ability 
to talk to each other had hopelessly atrophied. 
There is no doubt that some of those questions are beginning to 
be asked. The Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and 
General Secretary Gorbachev brought home to Europeans the 
uncomfortable realisation that the basic assumptions on which our 
entire defence stategy has been built could be overturned in a 
single day's conversation between the heads of the superpowers. 
Although the INF Treaty has been widely welcomed as ushering in a 
new period of reduced tension, the fact remains that it is the US 
senate, and it alone, which will decide if that Treaty is to be 
ratified by the Western side. The projected removal of an entire 
class of nuclear weapons from European territory is bound to give 
rise to a substantial re-assessment as to how we can best cope 
with the threat of Soviet military blackmail, at a time when we 
understand that public opinion in the US is increasingly 
concerned at the nature, quality and extent of its commitment to 
defend Western Europe. These developments in an historic 
alliance which endured for 40 years should not give rise to 
irrational fears on either side of the Atlantic: international 
relationships must evolve and adapt to change like everything 
else. No one questions the paramountcy of the NATO Alliance and 
the necessity of maintaining its institutions - the Military 
Committee .and the .Integrated .command ..Structure - .uitact. 1t ..is 
however my personal belief that Europe must take an increasing 
share of the responsibility for its own defence, including closer 
cooperation between Britain and France, the two nuclear powers. 
Further I believe that the United States should facilitate this 
process and look upon the development of a strong and coherent 
European pillar as a desirable method of strengthening NATO, 
certainly not a means of weakening it. Indeed for many of us who 
believe in an eventual European Union, a common defence and 
security policy is a necessary element in the final binding 
together of our ancient nation states, and this is the best 






I am a member of that post-war generation which grew up during 
the period of reconstruction so generously assisted and financed 
by the United States. I was in my freshman year at Oxford when 
John Kennedy made his inaugural address and I remember to this 
day the excitment and sense of purpose he evoked. For us, those 
fundamental American virtues of decency and idealism have shone 
like beacon lights in an increasingly cynical world and it is 
shared memories and emotions that bind us together more securely 
than any international treaty or agreement. 
Yet times change and so do circumstances. We Europeans are 
embarked on the road of political and economic integration, an 
adventure every bit as exciting and challenging in its way as the 
great American expansion of the last century. In achieving 
European Union we need the understanding and support of the 
United States, just as you need our sympathy and help as you 
struggle to adjust your economy to the new realities of the 
1990s. Sentiment is no substitute for frankness; we must be 
prep~red to discuss our problems candidly and seek mutually 
acceptable solutions, there is no point pretending they don't 
exist. Working together, the United States and the European 
Community can make a massive contribution to a better and happier 
world, but if we fall out the future for all of us is bleak. Our 
friendship and shared values have stood the test of time - we 
must never make the mistake of taking them for granted. 
MJW/em 
24 February 1988 
